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Abstract 
 
My argument is that Chalmers' Zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down 
to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal inter-
nal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily im-
plies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere phy-
sical' being is transcended if, in the form of phenomenal perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals – a 
transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic co-operation of perception, evaluation 
and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the 
principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism – primarily seeming a more insignificant 
circumstance – as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) 
compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the – maybe paradoxical – possibility of 
a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Behavioral decisions, such as avoiding a disturbing obstacle, are everyday mental processes 
that realize senseful relationships. Brain research also ultimately aims at senseful relationships, try-
ing to develop them from coincidences of behavior and brain activity (or verbal reports), for exam-
ple, if the intake of food goes hand in hand with the activation of the reward center. But what it 
finds empirically are always physical facts and never senseful mental states. Joseph Levine (1993) 
has pointed to this discrepancy between physically demonstrable brain activities and the correlating 
senseful mental as an explanatory gap of brain research. David Chalmers calls it ''the hard pro-
blem'', in contrast to ''easy problems'' of neuronal-functional relationships such as learning, memory, 
figure segregation etc. (Chalmers 2007, 59). In my opinion that will not be the last word, because, 
as I have explained elsewhere, this criticism is based on a deficient concept of the 'physical' (Wand-
schneider 2015 and 2016a). 
The diverse organizational forms of life testify to the possibilities that are actually realized in 
the physical. The living organism is not only the marvel of a system that functions perfectly in a 
technical sense, but – which will be explained in more detail below – due to the principle selfpre-
servation the basis of sense and thus of something that is no more only a primitive 'bare physical'. 
This senseful component that goes beyond the merely physical becomes more clearly recognizable 
in the contrasting juxtaposition with the robot (in today's sense), which – despite all technical per-
fection – is characterized by manifest sense dementia. The principle self-preservation as the basis 
of 'selfness' and 'sense', and thus as a transgression of the primitive bare physical, is the central 
theme of this study. 
Before that, however, I have to deal with a mighty objection that might well concern an un-
dertaking like this: I think of the doctrine developed by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind, 
according to which the request, phenomenal mentality (and thus something like 'sense') to under-
stand from physical must fail for (modal) logical reasons. I would like to show that this view is not 
tenable but boils down to a petitio principii and that Chalmers' basic argument for an existence of 
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 the mental independent of all physical, which goes back to Saul Kripke, rather concerns the unde-
niable privacy of the – nonetheless physically based mental inner perspective. 
 
2. Chalmers' Zombie-Doctrine 
 
Chalmers argues with the logical possibility of a 'zombie world': ''We can consider the logical 
possibility of a zombie world: a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no consci-
ous experiences at all. In such a world, everybody is a zombie. [...] So let us consider my zombie 
twin. This creature is molecule for molecule identical to me, and identical in all low-level properties 
postulated by a completed physics, but he lacks conscious experience entirely'' (Chalmers 1996b, 
94, also 71 and others). In this thought experiment, the zombie world is assumed to be an exact 
physical replica of our world, in which physically and biologically everything can be explained as 
in our world, including such abilities as are characteristic of higher animals and humans: learning, 
memory, perception, behavioral control, attention, categorization, language skills, etc. (16 ff). All 
this, according to Chalmers, can be derived from the physical facts assumed to be identical in both 
worlds – with one single exception: ''There will be no phenomenal feel'' (95), i.e. phenomenal states 
would not exist in the zombie world. 
Why not? In contrast to ''almost everything'' else, Chalmers argues (1996b, 45), the phenome-
nal-mental is not logically supervenient on the physical, but possesses ''mere natural supervenien-
ce''. It is therefore indeed nomological derivable, i.e. on the basis of contingent empirical natural 
laws, but not in a purely logical way (37 f). For this reason, so Chalmers, it is to be conceivable, and 
thus also logically possible, that my zombie twin, who physically and even (in a neuronal-functional 
sense) psychologically exactly resembles me in the zombie world, does not possess phenomenal 
consciousness, unlike me. Although it arises from the physical, it does not follow logically from it 
(125).  
What is unclear here is first of all why 'almost everything', explicitly also biological properties 
(e.g. 35, 74), should logically supervene on ''physical properties'', finally therefore on the laws of 
nature, but this kind of logical supervenience is denied to the phenomenal, since it is only nomologi-
cal, i.e. – likewise! – supervenient on natural laws. In fact, there is a fundamental ambiguity in 
Chalmers on this point: ''I am not suggesting that high-level facts and laws are entailed by mi-
crophysical laws [...] I am making the much weaker claim that high-level facts are entailed by all 
the microphysical facts (perhaps along with microphysical laws)” (71), whereby the microphysical 
'facts', despite this less expressive characterization – should be completely different in other possi-
ble worlds and thus have contingent status. What Chalmers thus is presumptively about is simply 
the strict differentiation of physical structures on the one hand, which (in principle) can throughout 
physically be explained (in this respect 'logical' supervenience) and phenomenal-mental forms on 
the other hand for which this, following Chalmers, should not apply (insofar 'only natural' superve-
nience) – but both on the merely contingent basis of 'microphysical facts'. 
This argument of the contingency of the physical is what underlies the zombie thought expe-
riment. The zombie world is presupposed as exactly the same world as ours – i.e. including all the 
laws of nature – however without the forms of phenomenal experience. That such a world, so 
Chalmers, is contradiction-free conceivable, is intended to illustrate the logical possibility that the 
phenomenal is essentially different from the physical, since it is logically independent of the latter. 
Chalmers puts forward five arguments in favour of this: 
(1) A zombie world is conceivable without contradiction. Of course, this is more of an assu-
rance than an argument. For this, Chalmers can only put his own subjective certainty into the field: 
''I can discern no contradiction in the description'' (Chalmers 1996b, 96, 99). And the hint that the 
otherness of my zombie twin could be based on ''nonstandard realizations of ... functional organi-
zation'' (97) contradicts the basic assumption that it should be physically exactly the same to me. 
(2) The possibility of a so-called inverted spectrum is also conceivable (Chalmers 1996b, 99 
ff), ie. where I see 'red' my zombie twin sees 'blue', although we both use the same name for it 
(about 'red'). What Chalmers asserts here is basically the inaccessibility of the  1st-person perspecti-
ve from the outside, I will come back to this later. 
 (3) This also applies to the fact of epistemic asymmetry (Chalmers 1996b, 101 ff) that consci-
ousness is only given for myself, i.e. in the first person perspective – while learning, memory, per-
ception etc. very well are accessible and researchable from the outside. 
(4) The thought experiments of Frank C. Jackson ('Mary') and Thomas Nagel ('What is it like 
to be a bat?') mentioned by Chalmers also go in the direction of the  1st-person perspective (Chal-
mers 1996b, 103 f): Mary, who grew up in a pure black and white environment, has never experien-
ced any colour qualities, although, as a top expert, she knows everything about visual perception. 
But knowledge can neither convey nor replace her color experience. And analogously, the resear-
cher who knows everything about bats cannot know what it feels like to be a bat.  
(5) Chalmers finally asserts (Chalmers 1996b, 104 ff) that the analysis of neuronal functions 
(= 3rd person perspective) can explain memory, learning etc., but not phenomenal experience (=  
1st-person-Perspective). One reason for this is to be the vagueness of what should actually be de-
termined (e.g. ''does a mouse have beliefs?'' (105)). 
In my view, these arguments do not do what they are conceived to do: (1) and (5) have only 
an assuring character with regard to what actually was to be proven (the impossibility to derive the 
phenomenal from the physical). (2), (3) and (4) are based on the inaccessibility of the  1st-person 
perspective. This seems to be at all the central issue that is ultimately always at stake in this book. 
Chalmers himself admits that the intuition on which his view is based has its origin in this (Chal-
mers 1996b, 110).  
As I would like to show, this is in fact also the key to the following argumentation, which 
goes back to considerations by Saul Kripke and is intended to theoretically secure Chalmers' zom-
bie fiction – extending beyond its mere conceivability. A decisive role is played by the concept of 
the rigid designator, which denotes the same thing in all possible worlds (Kripke 59). Kripke also 
develops the idea of a two-dimensional semantics in which a distinction must be made between a 
primary intension and a secondary intension – I take over the terms used by Chalmers here and thus 
formulate the decisive argument at once (Chalmers 1996b, 146 f):  
For example, the primary intension of water is 'wateriness' (as I call it that for simplicity's sa-
ke), the secondary intension of water is 'H2O', namely in all possible worlds. If in one of the possi-
ble worlds there would be a form of wateriness that is not H2O but XYZ, then the term 'water' 
would be misused here; it might be a similarly watery seeming liquid like gasoline.  
A strictly analogous argument for the phenomenal state of pain and the neural pain nerve sti-
mulation would take the following form: Primary intension of pain is 'pain sensation', secondary 
intension of pain is 'pain nerve stimulation', namely in all possible worlds. If in one of the possible 
worlds there would be a form of pain sensation that is not pain nerve stimulation but UVW, then the 
term 'pain sensation' would be misused here; it might be perhaps a tickle. 
But according to Kripke or Chalmers, in this case it cannot be argued in this way, because 
'feeling of pain' as a rigid designator means the same thing in all possible worlds, namely a painful 
condition. So if in one of the possible worlds a form of pain sensation exists which is not pain nerve 
irritation but UVW, then the term pain sensation is not misused here, because 'pain sensation' is a 
rigid designator. A feeling of pain is a feeling of pain in all possible worlds, regardless of whether a 
pain nerve stimulation or UVW is realized. For this reason, the feeling of pain cannot be identical 
with pain nerve stimulation (in Kripke's conception) or logically supervene on it (in Chalmer's con-
ception). 
Now, 'wateriness' too is a rigid designator, i.e. it describes something watery in all possible 
worlds. This raises the question why there is a misuse of the word when water is called 'water' in the 
XYZ world (since it is actually gasoline) – while pain, regardless of how the associated pain sensa-
tion is instantiated in a possible world (as pain nerve irritation or as an UVW process), is still aptly 
called 'pain'. 
The answer to that, I think, is now clear: Water, interpreted as watery stuff, is constitutively 
linked to H2O, so that gasoline is wrong watery stuff. Pain, on the other hand, interpreted as a fee-
ling of pain, is to stand for itself, ie. the connection with pain nerve irritation is from the outset as 
not constitutive defined, so that in other possible worlds completely different instantiations can oc-
cur without affecting the character of the feeling of pain. Other instantiations are thus classified as 
merely contingent side effects, in other words: Not the fact that 'feeling of pain' is a rigid designator 
 justifies its completely different character compared to 'watery' stuff – 'watery' too is a rigid Desi-
gnator -, but because 'feeling of pain' is set up from the start as something that is principally not 
constitutively linked to the physical. So, what the argument was intended to show – the logical pos-
sibility of zombies, in the sense of the absolute heterogeneity of mental and physical states – has 
been included in the premise from the outset – obviously a petitio principii. The rigid designator 
argument, which at first appears to be promising, and which was to provide the theoretical basis for 
the presumed logical possibility of zombies, is not conclusive. Maybe the zombie friends will ans-
wer: 'But the zombie fiction remains conceivable and therefore logically possible'. But the attacka-
ble mere conceivability was to be replaced by the rigid designator argument, so that the renewed 
appeal to the mere conceivibility is circular. 
Some statements of Chalmers himself underline these considerations: ''The secondary intensi-
on and the primary intension of 'pain' coincide'' (Chalmers 1996b, 149): naturally, because the pain 
phenomenon is seen as standing for itself, i.e. as not constitutively being bound to the physical, whi-
le the wateriness of water, for example, is linked to H2O with the consequence that the primary and 
secondary intension of 'water' differ. Chalmers himself states that ''Kripke's apparatus of rigid desi-
gnation and the like is not central'' (149), which is consistent with the developed argumentation. 
What he, on the other hand, takes over positively from Kripke is the idea of the ''logical possibility 
of dissociating physical states from the associated phenomenal states'' (147) – so indeed precisely a 
''dissociation'' of the physical and the phenomenal-mental as it is being presupposed in Chalmers' 
fiction of a zombie world. 
Altogether, it seems to me, Chalmers' central arguments, as explained, are on the one hand not 
conclusive, on the other hand reducible to the undeniable fact that the phenomenal-mental  1st-
person perspective is inaccessible from the outside, i.e. cannot be taken in principle by neuroscience 
which is arguing from the 3rd person perspective. Ultimately, this intuition also seems to underlie 
the claim used in the rigid-designator argument the sensation of pain to be body-independent. In 
short, the inaccessibility of the  1st-person perspective 'from the outside': this is probably the real 
core argument which is more or less hidden under intricate modal-logical considerations in this irri-
tating book.  
In the following I would like to develop an argument to reconstruct – not to discuss away – 
that  1st-person horizon:2 The point is to show that the 'physical', as far as it is organized as a living 
being, develops subject character and thus an own dimension, in which sense emerges, which in 
higher animals occurs in the form of phenomenal perception. In conclusion some basic considerati-
ons about this project follow.  
 
3. The Organismic 'Care Structure' 
 
In my opinion, the concept of care structure, which Heidegger refers to human existence 
(Heidegger 1960, e.g. 196), offers a generally apt characterization of organismic existence: The ba-
sic condition of all living beings is self-preservation and therewith the concern for one's own exi-
stence. Self-preservation: This is not the way of existence of a boulder, for example, that may easily 
be preserved for thousands of years – or not. Whatever happens to the boulder, it is in any case in-
different to that. For the living organism, on the other hand, there is no eternal life either, but it ne-
ver is indifferent to that what happens to it, on the contrary: In its being it is permanently concerned 
with nothing else but its own being. (We are not talking here about the very special situation of the 
spirit-being 'human being').  
This existential concern is the basic character of all living beings. Everything in it is pervaded 
by that: Originating from evolutionary selection, it is – as it were by definition, i.e. logically neces-
sarily – endowed with precisely those qualities and abilities that enable it (under the given envi-
ronmental conditions) to maintain itself in existence. The principle self-preservation, to which all 
organisms are subject, means that they are essentially concerned about their own being.  
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 For the individual, the principle self-preservation means the permanent monitoring and secu-
ring of his essential conditions of existence. For this purpose, it requires a valuation system that 
controls all external and internal changes with regard to their system compatibility and initiates ap-
propriate reactions – a fundamental function of organismic systems. (In higher animals, memory 
plays an important role in this process: Valuations of earlier perceptions and actions are stored in it 
and can be recalled in similar situations. When we speak of 'valuation' in the following, memory is 
therefore always included). 
But where does this elementary capacity of all living things – the secret of life, as it were – 
come from, by which it is distinguished from inanimate nature in a fundamental sense? The answer 
to this seemingly difficult question arises, I think, from a fundamentally 'Darwinian' argument: Only 
organisms capable of such control and assurance of the essential conditions of their existence were 
able to survive and reproduce. 
Essential for the organism in the sense of the principle self-preservation is therefore the con-
stant reference of all life processes to the conditions of its existence, i.e. to that which constitutes its 
essence, or in short its 'self'. With the principle self-preservation a self is constituted, and the orga-
nism thus as a 'self-ish' being, i.e. reflexively related to its self, and thereby a subject3. In this sense, 
organisms, even at the lowest levels of organization, are subjects, and as such permanently reflexi-
vely related to themselves by the concern for their own being. 
But can self-preservation not also be implemented in robots? Mind you: Robots in today's 
sense – not to be confused with Chalmers' zombie twin, which also exists without consciousness, 
but is biologically perfectly equipped – while the ''more-or-less serial virtual machines'' that Daniel 
Dennett has in mind with regard to human consciousness are more similar to robots (Dennett 1991, 
e.g. 218 ff)4. In any case, the robot can be programmed to perform 'self-tests', such as checking the 
charge of its battery and looking for a socket when that needs to be charged. Similarly, other 'self-
preservation actions' can be implemented – behaviors that are determined by the robot's program-
ming. But isn't evolution, to which organismic self-preservation is owed, also a kind of 'program-
ming', here in the form of natural selection? So what would be the difference to robots? Is the orga-
nism not also a robot? There is no doubt that more comprehensive 'self-maintenance programs' can 
be realized for robots than just looking for a power outlet when the battery charge drops. The self-
tests can be extended and appropriate safety options can be programmed. A principled limit of such 
'self-preservation programming' is not recognizable. Does the robot's lack of self-preservation thus 
ultimately depend on the more or less complex programming of its functions? 
One of Kant's great insights is undoubtedly his interpretation of the organism as an end in it-
self, and that is to say as a purpose-means configuration in the form of inner expediency (Kant KU § 
63 ff): All organs here are means to the end of the preservation of the organism, and this is conver-
sely means to the end of the preservation of the organs, so that in the organism ''everything is an end 
and mutually also means'' (Kant KU § 66). Inner expediency thus means that the only end of all or-
ganismic achievements is the existence of the organism itself, i.e. its self-preservation. In contrast, 
the robot is conceived as a means to achieve a purpose defined by the programmer. The robot is 
thus a means to an end, but it is in any case not an end in itself, and its actions are accordingly not 
directed towards self-preservation – even if its behavioral routines provide for self-tests and appro-
priate measures to secure the device. 
The decisive point is: When the battery charge drops, looking for a socket is by no means a 
pupose of the robot itself, but of the programmer to maintain the functionality of the device. Simi-
larly the 'autonomous', self-driving car is programmed to prevent accidents, i.e. to ensure the inte-
grity of the passengers, other road users and all the vehicles, including the self-driving car itself. 
But that is not the purpose of the self-driving car itself, but that of its designer. The self-driving car 
is just as little an end in itself as the self-charging robot. Both are merely a means to an end alien to 
them, set by the programmer or designer. 
Thus it is also clear that the natural origin of the organism – which may at first appear to be a 
rather insignificant circumstance – actually means a principled difference compared to the technical 
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 construct. Certain, evolution too can be understood as a kind of programming of living beings, and 
in this respect the comparison with robots is obvious. But what has emerged from the selectionist 
fire is essentially – quasi logically necessary (as already noted above) – an end in itself, i.e. a being 
on its own, which has been given the task of surviving in its habitat, with precisely those characteri-
stics and abilities that were given to it by selection. To preserve its existence against possible 
threats: That is the essential existential orientation that results from its structure as an end in itself.  
It is this totalization of existential orientation that distinguishes the organism from the robot. 
If, for example, the robot's 'clothing' is made of metal or plastic, which it does not take care of and 
does not have to take care of, since it is sufficiently stable dimensioned by the designer, the skin 
enclosing the living body is subject to permanent self-control in the sense of the principle self-
preservation and is in a state of permanent regeneration and self-repair. The robot is a means to an 
end. This also applies, so to speak, to the organism – but in such a way that this is not an external 
end to it, but that this end is itself: a different formulation for the fact that it is a self, a subject. In 
short, this 'self'-relatedness is essentially due to its natural origin. For what has naturally come into 
being has come into being selectionistically, and what selection produces are, quasi by definition, 
beings destined for self-preservation. This very 'self-purpose' inherent in them, their concern for 
their own being, is indeed to be understood as the dowry of their natural origin. On the other hand, 
the robot is not able to shed its non-natural, technical origin. It owes its existence and function to 
the constructor's purposes pursued with it, which are external to its existence and do not establish an 
existential care structure.  
 
4. The emergence of sense 
 
If a subject pursues a purpose with his activity, then the activity has a sense for the subject. 
For the organism, food intake has sense in terms of its existential purpose of maintaining vital func-
tions. Switching to another behaviour, such as attack or flight, has sense in a prey or danger situati-
on. In this way sense results from the purpose of an activity. Purposes constitute sense for the sub-
ject pursuing purposes relevant for it. Thus sense can be taken as subject relevance. 
This also makes it clear for whom sense is constituted thereby: The actions of the robot realize 
the purposes specified by its designer.Therefore they make sense for the designer, not for the robot 
itself. The situation is different in the case of the organism: All organismic processes are subject to 
the principle self-preservation and are thus directed towards the realisation of purposes that are pur-
poses of the organism itself. The organism is an end in itself, and this means that the organismic 
processes make sense for it itself. In short: With the determination of the organism, as defined by 
the general purpose of self-preservation, a sense dimension to be assigned to it is also constituted. 
Incidentally, in relation to the organism determination is probably a more appropriate term 
than 'purpose', because the use of 'purpose' is connoted with mental intent and planning and is thus 
inadequate for the organism in general. In the following, therefore, the more general term determi-
nation will be used instead of 'purpose', while this will to be reserved for the human domain. 
The determination of organismic subjects is self-preservation. Through this cardinal determi-
nation of all life, sense is constituted for the organismic subject. Of course, this is no longer a physi-
cal fact5 that could be empirically determined and measured, but a characteristic that can only be 
grasped by the subject himself: the subject relevance of his own life process, which is realized in 
the cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior. Elsewhere I have briefly referred to this trini-
tas of perception, valuation and behavorial action as the perc-val-act system.6 It forms the organis-
mic framework for realizing sense, and in this way it can be studied how something ontologically 
completely different – sense – can arise on a physical basis. 
The key term for understanding these relationships is the concept of emergence. I have deve-
loped that point in detail elsewhere (Wandschneider 2015) and only briefly outline the basic idea 
here: Emergence is a systemic phenomenon: A system has – fundamentally seen – properties and 
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 regularities other than its subsystems by which it is constituted. Instructive is the example given by 
Konrad Lorenz of the electrical oscillation circuit, which owes the oscillation behavior to its com-
ponents, coil and capacitor, which themselves do not have such oscillation properties (Lorenz 1973, 
47 ff). 
Thus by system formation new laws emerge, system laws. The perc-val-act system, which is 
constitutive for the organism, is physically composed in all its parts, but on the level of the perc-val-
act system itself, different, purely subject-related properties emerge – subject relevance or sense – 
that can no longer be qualified as physical. They are indeed neurally realized, but what perceptually 
emerges on the perc-val-act level for the subject himself are ideal sense-contents (note: not sensual 
contents!) (Wandschneider 2016 a): precisely that which is relevant for their survival. Qua 'sense', 
the 'merely physical' is exceeded: as an existential demand on the subject, as a determination that 
motivates it to behave according to the principle self-preservation. The valuation of the sensory sti-
mulus – in short: the valuation response – is a genuine addition of the subject himself. It is the va-
luation response that controls the activity of the subject, not the original sensory signal, because the 
subject qua subject does not act on the neural basis, but on the perc-val-act level, which is determi-
ned by the cooperation of perception, valuation and action, through which sense is constituted. 
It is therefore clear that 'sense' is not something that would be visible or measurable to the 
empirically working researcher, but is sense only for the organismic subject itself, an exclusive for-
mat of the subject perspective, so to speak – in humans one would speak of the  1st-person perspec-
tive. For this reason, the biologist or brain researcher, who as such always takes the 3rd person per-
spective, will never find anything like 'sense' – which makes the notorious empirical skepticism 
about 'sense' as understandable as insubstantial. This subject-relatedness means that I cannot know 
'what it is like to be a bat' (Nagel 1981) – of course, because I myself am not the bat subject. 
In this context a clarification is necessary: The talk of 'sense' may seem strange in view of lo-
wer organisms, which are only able to react to very elementary stimuli such as light intensity or aci-
dity. However, they too are subject to the principle self-preservation and valuate the stimuli recei-
ved. They also exist as subjects and as such not on the purely neural, but on the perc-val-act level: 
Qua valuation the sensory stimuli have subject relevance and therefore sense for them as well – but, 
and this is the reason for the strangeness of the attribution of sense in this case, they don't 'know' 
about it. Neither the rose nor the earthworm is able to grasp this sense as sense. But everything that 
happens to them is valuated by the valuation system in terms of the organismic general purpose of 
self-preservation and thus has indeed existential sense for them. How the lower organism reacts to 
stimuli is, according to the principle self-preservation, objectively sense-ful for it, but the process of 
sense-constitution happens implicitly, as it were, 'behind its back'. The existential sense is not expli-
citly grasped as such, but it is objectively given and thus indeed efficent in controlling the behavior. 
The situation is completely different in the case of higher animals, which have phenomenal 
perception (including sentiences). Phenomenal perception is to be understood as a differentiated 
perception scenario that not only presents the individual a (species-specific) more or less structured 
view of the reality it encounters, but also contains 'qualia' such as color impressions, tactile, taste, 
olfactory, pain sensations etc. How neural, i.e. physical brain processes are capable to produce such 
phenomenal perceptions, is considered the hard problem of the philosophy of mind (Chalmers 
1996a, 1996b). The explanation gap (Levine 1983, 1993), which is claimed in this regard, turns out, 
as I concede, to be more difficult than I have argued elsewhere (Wandschneider 2015). Neverthe-
less, I would like to refer to the considerations developed there, which come to the conclusion that 
the phenomenal perception, can – and, as I think, only in this way – be explained as an emergence 
phenomenon of the perc-val-act system, due to its essential relatedness to valuation and behavior. 
The perception scenario presented by the phenomenal perception offers the individual, in ad-
dition to sensations of internal sensitivities, a (species-specific) detailed view of the external reality, 
e.g. the spatial relationships of the objects to one another ('before', 'between', 'behind', 'above', 'un-
der'), together with the valuations assigned to the perceptions, e.g. the 'threat' of a bird of prey con-
tour or the 'attractiveness' of a prey object. What is decisive in this context is that the behavior is 
thus no longer controlled in a purely reflective automatic manner through the respective valuation 
response as in lower animals, but it rather has the scenario of phenomenal perception in front of it 
and is predominantly oriented to that. In contrast to the primitive, purely valuation-reflective beha-
 vioral control, behavior in higher animals is thus increasingly linked to and controlled by phenome-
nal perception. I would like to call this the principle of phenomenally-instructed behavior. The dif-
ferentiated perception scenario, in which the valuations are integrated, allows for far more flexible 
behavior than is possible through genetically rigidly predeterminated reflex reactions, which require 
a constant habitat, but are no longer effective in rapidly changing environments. This increase in 
behavioral efficiency makes the evolutionary tendency towards phenomenal perception in the cour-
se of the faunal development seem plausible.7  
The principle of phenomenally-instructed behavior in higher organisms means that the beha-
vior is based on a differentiated perception scenario, whereby the perceptual contents are perceived 
as senseful by the subject. For the mouse, for example, the bird of prey contour appearing in its en-
vironmental scenario immediately gains priority with regard to its behavioral decisions, with the 
result that the flight reaction appears to be the only sensible option in view of the numerous other 
behavioral options that the perception scenario also offers. Sense is thus given in a more concrete, 
more explicit form. The negative sense of the prey contour stamps it as an aversive object and is 
perceived in this form. And in sensations like 'lustful', 'disgusting', 'painful' etc., the associated posi-
tive or negative valuation itself is directly experienced as senseful. 
In this respect, in the case of higher animals, whose behavior is controlled via the phenomenal 
perception scenario, one can speak of a sense dimension, the sense contents of which are explicitly 
percepted as senseful. And as the sense character that is pervading all organismic processes, in the 
form of phenomenal perception now becomes explicitly perceptually graspable, too, a new subject 
dimension has been established, in which processing procedures become possible that already have 
the character of elementary mental operations. An obstacle, for example, that blocks the path to a 
goal, is perceived as 'disturbing'. At the same time, the perceptual scenario, which, as already men-
tioned, also presents the spatial relationships of the obstacle in its environment and with regard to 
the goal, also presents clues on how to remedy the disturbance, for example the possibility of skir-
ting the obstacle. 
Of course, the possibility to recognize an obstacle and to make the decision to avoid it is also 
available to the robot. But with regard to the considerations developed above, it is clear that the ro-
bot does not exist as an end in itself, as a subject, but follows an external purpose – the purpose gi-
ven to it by the designer. So only for the designer do the robot's actions make sense. The algo-
rithmic decision-making competence given to the robot so does not change anything in regard to its 
notoric sense dementia. He is just doing physical processes, not mental operations. 
The proper sentiences, such as lust, pain, disgust, smells, etc., form a subclass of the pheno-
menal perceptions. They are tinted strongly subjectively and can thus be understood as valuation 
perceptions of the (perceptual) valuations carried out by the subject. I have dealt with this distincti-
on between valuations of perceptions and valuation perceptions in detail several times (e.g. Wand-
schneider 2015; 2016b) and here I will only mention a few points that are of interest in view of the 
constitution of sense in the perception: 
Sentiences are to be understood as an important completion of the phenomenal perception: If 
the contact with a flame would only trigger an avoidance reflex without sensation of pain, the prin-
ciple of phenomenally-instructed behavior would be broken and the behavior-controlling sense of 
perception would be devalued. Another important function can be recognized, for example, in the 
sweet-sensation: In this, the physiological success, i.e. the increase in blood sugar, which occurs 
only with a delay, is, so to speak, symbolically anticipated and is thus immediately available for be-
havior control – for example, in order to be able to react immediately in competition with conspeci-
fics for food. The sweet-sensation is something like the preliminary headline of the delayed onset of 
blood sugar increase and thus an essential, behaviorally effective carrier of sense at the level of 
higher animals, which is characterized by the principle of phenomenally-instructed behavior. The 
naked 'measured value' of the sugar concentration in the food would not be sufficient for this, be-
cause it would also have to be valuated by the organism, just like everything else that the organism 
encounters. But sugar measurement plus valuation: That's exactly what makes up the sentience of 
                                                 
7  For this in detail Wandschneider 2015 
 sweetness. In short, sentiences are to be understood as a necessary completion of the phenomenal 
perception and the sense dimension constituted by it. 
 
5. Some Fundamental Considerations 
 
The analysis of Chalmer's arguments carried out above had shown, among other things, that 
his view of what makes the phenomenal-mental substantial seems to result in the basic privacy of 
the inner dimension. I have undertaken to reconstruct the basic structure of this privacy here accor-
ding to the systemic phenomenon of emergence in view of the principle self-preservation that per-
vades all life. 
Actually, it is obvious that self-preservation as a generative principle must lead (a) to subject 
formation and thus to privacy and (b) to the establishment of a sense dimension (because of the sub-
ject relevance of all life processes). This seems almost to be logically necessary, because, as explai-
ned, self-preservation always implies something like selfness and sense. In this respect, Chalmers' 
zombie twin as well as the creatures of the zombie world would have to develop selfness and sense 
phenomena. Yes, one could even come to the conclusion that this is to take place in all possible 
worlds in which the principle self-preservation can be implemented, regardless of how it is realized. 
Because self-preservation is self-preservation; what can preserve itself can preserve itself, whether 
as an organism made of flesh and blood or as a little green martian. And what is subject to the prin-
ciple self-preservation, as explained, must then also develop subjectivity ('privacy') and sense ('sur-
vival sense'). 
It is noteworthy that the natural-biological origin of the organism – which might initially ap-
pear to be a rather contingent circumstance – makes a momentous difference on principle compared 
to inorganic objects and artificial-technical constructs (robots), namely in regard to the constitution 
of sense and thus (in higher animals) phenomenal-soul. Put in a formula (which I'm liking to re-
peat), this means that soul and self-preservation essentially belong together. Thereby it should not 
be seen as a burdening mortgage that using the principle self-preservation the 'secret of life', as it 
were, is taken into serve. The possibility of self-organization of 'hypercycles' (Eigen 1976) and se-
lectionist arguments, also for the development of a valuation system, are sufficient for a principled 
understanding today. 
The second fundamental point concerns the phenomenon of emergence. Often suspected as a 
kind of magic formula, it is, viewed impartially, the simple systemic fact that cannot be disputed 
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, that the properties of a system can therefore be 
completely different from those of its components. The system under consideration here is what I 
call the perc-val-act system, which, in the cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior, as a 
whole realizes what the subject actually constitutes. The fact that sense emerges in this system is, as 
I said, due to the principle self-preservation. But the fact that sense is no longer a 'mere physical' 
fact (see above) is to be seen as an emergence phenomenon: as the certainly paradoxical possibility 
of realizing the non-physical in a system that is nevertheless physically constituted. I described this 
seemingly paradoxical configuration in a previous work as follows: ''If it is true that the mental can 
be understood as an emergence phenomenon of a physical system – such as the brain – then the 
mental is indeed physically based, but as a holistic phenomenon of the system as a whole it is also a 
novel type of property compared to the properties of the subsystems, which as such have 'mere phy-
sical' character, in other words: Although we have to speak of a physical system as a whole, the 
mental, as a phenomenon of wholeness, is typically different from the physical properties of the 
subsystems which, on the other hand, are, as it were, the 'merely physical' (i.e. without mental pro-
perties). In this respect, there is a dualism of physical and mental phenomena, but this in an overall 
physical system that is at the same time not dualistic, in short: Emergence relationships lead beyond 
the elementary-physical to typical novel properties, without, however, exeeding the overall range of 
the physical'' (Wandschneider 1999, 71 f). 
Chalmers, flirting with dualism and panpsychism in search of a theory of the phenomenal-
mental, could therefore, I think, be happy with emergentism. But he regards this theory to be one 
that only concerns the physical and remains attached to the physical (378 f), according to ''the gene-
ral principle that from structure and dynamics, one can infer only structure and dynamics'' (Chal-
 mers 2003, Ch. 7). But in the search for psycho-physical laws, which Chalmers would like to place 
alongside the laws of nature in order to take into account phenomenal-mental forms, emergence 
phenomena are expected to become important – as in the previous sense as an emergent property of 
the perc-val-act level was interpreted. But all of this is based on the laws of nature, as it were as a 
logic inherent in nature itself: That being natural thus always already contains the possibility of 
psychic is then no longer such a distant thought, that – in connection with the concept of emergence 
– could replace – rationalize – the rather strange hypothesis of panpsychism. 
A question that comes to my mind at the end: What if the emergentist reconstruction of the 
phenomenal-mental should succeed in the context of 'our' physical world? Are there any other, hig-
her reasons in order to nevertheless still hold onto a dualism? 
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